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ABSTRACT
Solvency II is a new regulatory standard for European insurance companies. It
aims to establish a revised set of capital requirements and risk management standards
that will replace the current solvency requirements within the European Union market
and will take effect in 2014. The directive will impact companies located in countries
beyond the European Union.
Compared with Solvency I, Solvency II requires insurers to hold 141% more
capital. Under solvency II, market risk is the most important risk component, accounting
for more than 60% of the capital requirement. Since the directive imposes a low risk
charge on AAA rated EU sovereign bonds and short-duration and highly rated corporate
bonds, these types of bonds will be favored by insurers. Insurance companies are
expected to reduce their equity investments due to its high risk charge.
The US RBC system differs from Solvency II in its capital requirement, regulatory
reporting, and information disclosure. The National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) is reviewing its capital requirement methodology and is
considering adopting a similar correlation matrix among component risks as in Solvency
II. This paper evaluates how the capital requirement for US insurers will change with the
incorporation of a correlation matrix and estimates that US insurers will hold 15% more
pre-tax capital or 11% more post-tax capital.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO SOLVENCY II
As a continuous effort to improve the risk management practice in insurance
companies, Solvency II Directive was adopted by the Council of the European Union and
Parliament in November 2009. Solvency II is a fundamental and wide ranging review of
the current insurance directives. It aims to establish a revised set of capital
requirements and risk management standards that will replace the current solvency
requirements within the European Union market and will take effect in 2014. The
objective of the new regulation is enhanced policyholder protection, increased
competition in the European Union insurance market, and an enhanced supervisory
review process. The objectives are to be achieved by introducing a risk-based system in
which risk is measured using consistent principles and capital requirements are aligned
with the underlying risks of the company. The directive will bring dramatic changes to
capital adequacy requirements, corporate governance, and public disclosures.
Solvency II is based on three guiding pillars that intend to offer better risk
measurement and management in market, credit, operational, insurance, and liquidity
risks. The pillars focus on minimum capital requirements, risk measurement and
management, and information disclosure respectively.
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Pillar I provides the quantitative requirements for capital adequacy, and defines
the methods used to value assets and liabilities, to measure own funds, and to calculate
capital requirements.
Solvency II outlines two levels of capital requirements, the Minimum Capital
Requirement (MCR) and the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR). Both the MCR and the
SCR provide an early indicator to regulators and insurance companies as to whether or
not action needs to be taken. MCR is the threshold that could trigger ultimate
supervisory action. If an insurer’s capital is below MCR, policyholders and beneficiaries
are exposed to an unacceptable level of risk if the firm continues to operate. A capital
level between SCR and MCR may lead to some supervisory actions. Capital at or above
the SCR level gives reasonable assurance to policyholders and beneficiaries that the
insurer to remain solvent.
MCR is defined as the amount of economic capital needed to limit the probability
of insolvency over the coming year to no more than 15%. SCR is defined as the level of
capital that results in no more than a 0.5% chance of failure over a one-year time
horizon.
The Directive provides a standard formula to compute both MCR and SCR. The

standard formula is a linear, factor-based model. The factors include:
1. Market risk, including interest rate, equity, property, spread, currency, illiquidity,
and concentration risks;
2. Default risk;
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3. Life risk, including mortality, longevity, disability, laps, expenses, revision, and
catastrophe risks;
4. Non-life risk, including premium reserve, lapse, and catastrophe risks;
5. Health insurance risk, including short/long-term insurance, and all life risks.
Under the Directive, an insurer is allowed to use internal models to determine the
capital requirement. If the internal approach is adopted, the company must meet a
series of tests for the model and obtain approval from the regulator who would be
receiving the results.
According to “Article 74(1), Draft Framework Directive”, all assets and liabilities
are evaluated on a market consistent approach. Insurance and reinsurance companies
should value their assets at the amount for which they could be exchanged between
willing parties. Liabilities should be valued at the amount for which they could be
transferred, or settled between willing parties.
Own funds are the capital resources of the insurer and are composed of basic own
funds and ancillary own funds. It is designed to ensure that companies have the right
amount of capital to meet the regulatory requirement. Basic own funds are the excess
of assets over liabilities plus subordinated debt1. Ancillary own funds consist items not
covered in the basic own funds which can absorb losses2. Examples of ancillary own
funds include letters of credit and guarantees. Basic own funds are reported on the
balance sheet and the ancillary own funds are off-balance sheet.

1
2

See the definition in Article 88, Solvency II Directive
See the definition in Article 89, Solvency II Directive
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Liabilities are divided into technical provisions (insurance liabilities) and noninsurance liabilities.

Technical provisions are an insurance company’s contract

obligations related to policyholders and beneficiaries. Under Solvency II, a technical
provision is calculated as the sum of a best estimate (BE) and a risk margin (RM). The BE
is the probability weighted average of the present value of future cash flows discounted
by the risk-free yield curve. The risk margin is the amount “to ensure that the value of
technical provision is equivalent to the amount that insurance and reinsurance
undertakings would be expected to require in order to take over and meet the
insurance and reinsurance obligations”3. Therefore, to calculate RM, an insurer needs
first to project its annual insurance obligations until its extinction and then determine
the SCR needed to meet the obligations in each year. The annual SCRs are then
discounted by risk free rates. The sum of the discounted SCRs times the cost of capital,
is called risk margin. In QIS 5 (The Fifth Quantitative Impact Study), the cost of capital is set
as 6% for all participants.4
As discussed in the previous paragraphs, the key components in Pillar I include
asset, liability, own fund, technical provision, SCR, and MCR. Figure 1 summarizes the
relationship among these components. Capital surplus is the excess of assets over
liability and capital requirement.

3

4

See Item 3, Article 77 in the Solvency II Directive

See TP.5.25 in QIS 5 Technical Specification
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Figure 1: Relationship of Pillar I Components
Ancillary Own
Funds

Capital Surplus

Own Funds
Basic Own Funds

SCR
MCR

Risk Margin
Assets Covering
TP, MCR, SCR

Technical
Provisions (TP)

Assets
Best Estimate

Other Liabilities

Pillar II raises requirements on corporate governance and requires demonstration
of an adequate system of governance. There are four blocks of governance under
Solvency II which include the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA), risk
management system, policy processes and procedures, and key functions.
ORSA will serve as an internal assessment of overall solvency needs of an insurer.
It is a unique characteristic of Solvency II since there are no comparable requirements in
other regulations. It will make both the firm itself and the supervisory bodies better
understand a firm’s risk profile. All insurers will be required to produce an ORSA system
regardless of whether they are working by their own internal model or by the standard
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model. In either case, if a regulator believes a company’s ORSA falls short, the regulator
will have the ability to impose higher capital requirements. Since the regulator has the
ability to impose capital add-ons, companies are incentivized to produce a robust and
deeply embedded self-analysis. Indeed, of all the pillars, Pillar II is likely the most
challenging in terms of implementation as it mandates what for many companies will be
a broad overhaul of the risk culture that will reach all levels of the company.
The essential components of a risk management system include risk management
strategies, policies, processes, and internal reporting procedures. Insurance companies
are required to document the objectives of risk management, risk management
principles, responsibilities, and internal risks and demonstrate the daily implementation
of risk prevention. The procedures and processes must enable the firm to identify,
manage, monitor, and report the current and future risks.
Pillar III centers on public disclosure and regulatory reporting requirements. As
stated in CEIOPS’ Advice to the European Commission, dated March 2007, on
Supervisory Reporting and Public Disclosure in the Framework of the Solvency II Project
(paragraph 2.2): “Supervisory reporting requirements in the Solvency II framework
should support the risk-oriented approach to insurance supervision while public
disclosure requirements should reinforce market mechanisms and market discipline.”
In alignment with this discipline, the Directive requires two types of reports. The Regular
Supervisory Report (RSR) is a report between an insurer and its national supervisory
organization. This report contains narrative and quantitative information that is
provided to the supervisory authority and kept confidential. The content includes
6

business performance, governance, risk profile, and capital management. The Solvency
and Financial Condition Report (SFCR) is a report available to public. In SFCR, a firm
should report information regarding business performance, governance, risk profile,
capital management, asset and liability valuation.
To execute the reporting requirements, companies need to interpret the
disclosure requirements, develop strategies for disclosure, and educate key
stakeholders on the results. The disclosed information will not only be available to
regulators but to financial analysts, rating agencies, and all other stakeholders. In
addition, compliance will mean that companies must develop the internal processes and
systems needed to produce said reports within the required time frames.

7

CHAPTER 2
SOLVENCY CAPITAL REQUIREMENT

Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) and Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR)
are the two levels of capital requirements outlined in Solvency II. MCR is the minimum
requirement for an insurer and the standard is less strict than SCR. Therefore, as long as
an insurer meets the SCR, MCR will not be a concern. In this paper, the MCR will not be
discussed in detail. The detailed requirements for MCR can be found in the section 6 of
QIS 5 Technical Specification.
The Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) is the risk-based capital requirement for
insurers under Solvency II. It is the 99.5% Value at Risk confidence level over one year. In
structure the SCR is composed of a number of ‘modules’ which in turn are composed of
‘sub-modules’. The structure of the SCR modules is shown in Figure 2.5 As shown in the
chart, the calculation of SCR is a bottom-up process. One needs to calculate the SCR for
each sub-module and then aggregate to total SCR. The calculation of the SCR for each
sub-module is defined in the QIS 5 Technical Specifications. The capital requirements
arising from these sub-modules and modules are aggregated using a correlation matrix6.

5
6

See SCR.1.1 on page 90 in the QIS Technical Specifications
The correlation matrixes are available in each sub-module section in the QIS 5 Technical Specification
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Figure 2: SCR Modules

Solvency II directive defines the standard formula for both SCR and MCR. SCR is
determined as follows:
ܵ ܴܥൌ  ܴܥܵܤ ݆݀ܣ ܴܵܥ7

（1）

 ܴܥܵܤis the basic solvency capital requirement. ݆݀ܣis the adjustment for the

risk absorbing effect of technical provisions and deferred taxes. ܴܵܥ is the capital
requirement for operational risk.

 ܴܥܵܤcaptures the correlation relations among market, counterparty default,

life underwriting, non-life underwriting, health underwriting risks, and intangibles. The
formula for  ܴܥܵܤis :
7

 ܴܥܵܤൌ ඥ ∑ǡ ݎݎܥǡ ൈ ܴܵܥ ൈ ܴܵܥ  ܴܵܥ௧௦8

SCR.1.27, QIS5 Technical Specifications
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（2）

ݎݎܥ is the (i,j)th element of correlation matrix of the entry risks mentioned

above. ܴܵܥܴܽ݊݀ܵܥ are the capital requirements for the individual SCR risks in the
row and column of the correlation matrix. The directive defines the method to calculate

the capital requirement for individual risk. In the Technical Specification, the Directive
defines the methods for each of the SCR risk.
ܴܵܥ௧௦ is the capital requirement for intangible asset risk and is equal to

the value of intangible assets times 0.8.9

݆݀ܣis composed of two parts and the standard formula is:
்݆݀ܣ =݆݀ܣ + ݆݀ܣ் 10

（3）

்݆݀ܣ is the adjustment for loss absorbency of technical provisions. ݆݀ܣ் is the
adjustment for loss absorbency of deferred taxes. They reflect the potential
compensation of unexpected losses through a simultaneous decrease in technical
provisions or deferred taxes or a combination of them.11 The loss absorbing effect arises
from the fact that in a stress situation some technical provision items values and at the
same time deferred tax liabilities decrease.
In the standard method, ݆݀ܣis allowed to be computed in two approaches- the

equivalent scenario and the modular approach. These methods are defined in the SCR 2
of Technical Specification.

8

SCR.1.3.1, QIS5 Technical Specifications
SCR.4, QIS5 Technical Specifications
10
SCR.2.9, QIS5 Technical Specifications
9

11

See Article 108, 2009 Solvency II Directive
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ܴܵܥ is the risk of loss due to inadequate or failed internal processes, or from

personnel and systems, or from external events. Operational risk should include legal
risks, and exclude risks arising from strategic decisions, as well as reputation risks.
The capital requirement for the operational risk is determined by:
ܴܵܥ = min(0.3 × ܴܥܵܤ, ܱ )+ 0.25 × ݔܧ௨12

（4）

ܱ is the basic operational risk charge for all business other than life insurance.

It equals the larger of premium operational risks or operational risks arising from
insurance obligations. Premium operational risk is the sum of premium earnings, and
operational risks due to insurance obligations is the sum of technical provisions.
Solvency II defines the formula to calculate the two components the ܱ in SCR 3 of the
Technical Specification.

ݔܧ௨ is the amount of annual expenses incurred during the previous 12 months

in respect life insurance where the investment risk is borne by the policy holders.

12

SCR.3.6, QIS5 Technical Specifications
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CHAPTER 3
IMPACT ON CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS AND INSURER RISK PROFILES
To obtain the detailed information on the quantitative impact of Solvency II on
insurance companies’ balance sheets and to encourage insurers and supervisory
authorities to prepare for the implementation of Solvency II, European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) launched five quantitative impact studies (QIS)
in the period of 2005 to 2010. In the series of studies, insurers used the tools designed
by EIOPA and based on the principles and standard formula defined in the Solvency II to
carry out simulations to test the practicability of the Directive approach and to measure
the impact of the proposed calculation methods on insurance companies’ balance
sheets. In addition, EIOPA allowed insurers to apply their own internal models to
calculate the capital requirements. EIOPA used the results of the studies to assess and
adjust the suitability of the standardized formula of the capital requirements under
Solvency II and to compare the results under the internal models. The latest test was the
5th quantitative impact study (QIS 5) conducted in 2010.
3.1 Overall Impact
QIS 5 is the most comprehensive study compared with other four previous studies.
A total of 2,520 (re)insurers and 167 groups, nearly 80% of the industry, participated in
the study. More than 95% of the value of technical provisions and 85% of the premiums
12

of the insurers subject to Solvency II are covered in the test. The small insurers13 were
more active in this study than in previous studies with more than double the number of
participants.
Under the Solvency II, the asset valuation for solo participants decreased by more
than 0.3%, from €7,456.6 billion to €7,432.4 billion. For group participants, the asset
valuation decreased by 1.3%, from €6,543.1 billion to €6,454.9 billion.14 Compared with
Solvency I, Solvency II increased liabilities valuation. Life insurance net provision
increased by 3% and the ratio for non-life insurance was 8%.15
Overall, the standard model based on the Solvency II requirements reduces the capital
surplus, including both solo and group participants, compared with Solvency I. The
reduction in surplus was driven by an increase in capital requirements. For example,
under Solvency I, the capital requirement was €227 billion in 2009. In contrast, the SCR
in the same year was €547 billion, a 141% increase.16 Capital surplus under the Solvency
I and the Solvency II is illustrated in Figure 3.

13

A non-life insurance company with less than €0.1 billion written premiums is categorized as a small company, with
between €0.1 billion and €1.0 is a medium company, with greater than €1.0 billion is a large firm. A life insurance
company with less than €1.0 billion gross technical provisions is categorized as a small company, with €1.0 billion-€10
billion is a medium company, and with greater than €10 billion is a large company.
14
See section 3 in the “EIOPA Report on the fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS5) for Solvency II”, EIOPA, March 2010
15
See section 4.1 in the “EIOPA Report on the fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS5) for Solvency II”, EIOPA, March
2010
16

See Table 6, Report on the fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS 5) for Solvency II
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Figure 317: Capital Surplus Under Solvency I and Solvency II
Solvency I
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Best Estimate

Technical Provisions
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15% of the participants couldn’t meet the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) and
5% failed to meet the Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR).
Figure 4 shows the overall quantitative effect of the switch from the current
requirements to the Solvency II. This figure demonstrates the capital surplus under
Solvency I and the capital surplus over SCR and MCR under Solvency II for solo
participants. It indicates that capital surplus over SCR decreased from €476.3 billion to
€354.6 billion. At the same time, the margin over the MCR increased by €200 billion.

17

Illustrated based on “Solvency II Technical Provisions”, Deloitte, April 2010
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Figure 4: Capital Surplus for Solo Participants (€billion)

676.0

476.3

354.6

Solvency I

SCR

MCR

Source: Graph 3, EIOPA Report on the Fifth Quantitative Study (QIS 5) for Solvency II

The drivers that explain the change in the surplus from the current regime to the
Solvency II framework include the shift in balance sheet, the change in the capital
requirements, and the differences in the own funds elements allowed to cover the
requirements. Figure 5 shows the respective influence of these drivers by splitting the
valuation impacts into positive (light blue column) and negative effects (red column).
The height of the bars represents the changes relative to the required surplus under
Solvency I. The left most column in the chart represents the surplus under Solvency I.
The right most column represents the surplus under Solvency II. Other columns
represent the factors that affect the change of the surplus. These factors reflect the
impact of changes in asset and liability valuation, changes in capital requirement
definition, own funds, and tax on the capital surplus. All factors including Solvency II
surplus are measured as a percentage of the Solvency I surplus.
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Figure 5: Drivers of the Surplus Changes
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Source: Graph 8, EIOPA Report on the Fifth Quantitative Study (QIS 5) for Solvency II

As shown in the figure, the negative and positive effects of asset valuation almost
offset each other. The positive effect of technical provision significantly out-weighted
the negative effect. Capital requirement under the Solvency II significantly reduced the
surplus.
Solvency ratio, measured by the ratio of own funds to SCR or MCR, is a critical
indicator of how close an insurer meets Solvency II’s benchmark capital requirement.
The QIS 5 results show that solvency ratio under Solvency II changes greatly compared
with that under Solvency I. Under the current regime, the average solvency ratio of
European insurers is 310%. In comparison, the ratio based on SCR is 165% and based on
MCR is 466%.

16

Compared with Solvency I, Solvency II introduced the ancillary own fund that
allows off balance items to be counted as own funds.18,19 As a result, the own funds
value under Solvency II increases significantly from € 703 billion to €902 billion. Figure 6
demonstrates the distribution of the solvency ratios.
Figure 6: Distribution of SCR and MCR Coverage

13.9%
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5.3%
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7.0%
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12.2%
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8.3%

4.2%
2.7%
2.0%

15.9%
17.1%
16.2%

11.4%

6.9%

Between 100% and 120%

25.7%

6.1%
8.8%

SCR Coverage

MCR Coverage

Source: Graph 4 and Graph 6, EIOPA Report on the Fifth Quantitative Study (QIS 5) for Solvency II

20% of the participants have SCR coverage between 120% and 200% and nearly
half of the firms hold more than twice their capital requirements. 15% of the insurers
hold capital less than the solvency capital requirement.
3.2 Risk Profile
Under Solvency II, SCR is a risk based measurement and is composed of multiple
risk charges. Therefore, the directive might reshape insurers’ risk profiles significantly by
adopting this new capital requirement definition. The impact study results show that
market risk is the dominant risk across all insurers. Equity risk, spread risk, and interest
18

Section 3.17 in “CEIOPS’ Advice for Level 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II: Own Funds-Article 97 and 99Classification and Elligibility, CEIOPS, October 2009
19
Page 25, “EIOPA Report on the fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS5) for Solvency II”, EIOPA, March 2010
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rate risk are the three driving components of market risk. In addition to the market risk,
life insurance firms bear significant large underwriting risks arising from life insurance
contracts, of which longevity and lapse risks are the two dominant components20. For
the non-life insurance companies, non-life underwriting risk is the second largest risk
next to market risk of which premium and reserving risk is largest risk component.21
Since BSCR is the sum of all risks except for operational risk, decomposition of
BSCR will uncover the most important source of risks. Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 illustrate
the composition of the BSCR for solo companies and group companies.
Figure 7.1: BSCR Breakdown-All Solo Participants

15.3%
56.5%

Market

20
21

16.9%

0.2%

100%

Non-Life

Intangible

BSCR

4.3%

6.9%

Counter Party

Life

Health

See Graph 35 and page 77 in EIOPA Report on the Fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS 5) for Solvency II
See Graph 36 and 46 in EIOPA Report on the Fifth Quantitative Impact Study (QIS 5) for Solvency II
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Figure 7.2: BSCR Breakdown-All Group Participants
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Source: Graph 33, EIOPA Report on the Fifth Quantitative Study (QIS 5) for Solvency II

The solo companies and group companies demonstrate the similar pattern in the
composition of BSCR. The market risk accounts for 57% of the total requirements,
indicating that marketing risk is the dominant risk for European firms.
Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2 break down the market risk into various sub-type risks
for solo and group participants respectively. As shown in the figures, the equity, spread,
and interest rate components are the largest elements of market risk.

19

Figure 8.1: Composition of Market Risk-All Solo Participants
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Figure 8.2: Composition of Market Risk-All Group Participants
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Source: Graph 37, EIOPA Report on the Fifth Quantitative Study (QIS 5) for Solvency II

If one divides the firms into life insurance and non-life insurance, the risk profiles
are somewhat different between the two groups. As shown in Figure 9.1 and Figure 9.2,
life insurance firms bear over 67% of market risk, significantly higher than that of 32.8%
for non-life insurance. As expected, nearly 24% of risk comes from underwriting of life
contract in life insurance group while only 0.5% of life insurance risk in non-life group.
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On the contrary, non-life insurance risk accounts for 52% of the total risk of non-life
firms compared with zero in the life group.
Figure 9.1: Breakdown of BSCR-All Solo Life Insurance Participants
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Figure 9.2: Breakdown of BSCR-All Solo Non-Life Insurance Participants
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Source: Graph 35 and Graph 36, EIOPA Report on the Fifth Quantitative Study (QIS 5) for Solvency II

21

As shown in the previous chart, life underwriting risk is the dominant risk for life
insurers. Figure 10.1 and Figure 10.2 illustrate the components of life underwriting risk
for solo participants and group participants respectively. The longevity and lapse risks
are the two most material components for both solo participants and group participants.
Figure 10.1: Components of Life Underwriting Risk-All Solo Participants
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Figure 10.2: Components of Life Underwriting Risk-All Group Participants
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Source: Graph 40, EIOPA Report on the Fifth Quantitative Study (QIS 5) for Solvency II
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The Figure 9.2 shows that non-life underwriting risk is the main risk for non-life
insurance companies. Figures 11.1 and 11.2 decompose the non-life underwriting risk
into several components for solo and group non-life insurance. The premium & reserve
and catastrophe are the two dominant components of the underwriting risk, both
accounting for more than half of the risk premium.
Figure 11.1: Components of Non-Life Underwriting Risk-All Solo Participants
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Figure 11.2: Components of Non-Life Underwriting Risk-All Group Participants
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Source: Graph 46, EIOPA Report on the Fifth Quantitative Study (QIS 5) for Solvency II

3.3 Internal Models
In the Solvency II regime, an insurer can choose to use its own internal model to
calculate the capital requirement if the model is approved by the regulatory authority.
In order to compare the impact of the standard formula and the internal models on the
capital requirement, the QIS 5 allowed the participants to compute the SCR using their
internal models and standard formula.
A total of 234 participants (about 10% of all participants) provided the SCR
results calculated by the internal models. Generally speaking, internal models return
lower SCR compared with the standard formula. The median ratio of internal model SCR
to standard formula SCR is 0.91 for solo participants. For the group participants, the
median ratio is 80% and the 90th percentile is 100%. For the 13 out of 19 countries that
provided internal model SCRs, the median ratio was below 100%.
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42% of the

participants that provided internal model results used partial internal models 22 to
calculate the SCR. The median ratio for this group of participants was 86%. For large and
medium participants, the median ratio was 93% compared with 101% for the small
participants. Therefore, the internal model may be an attractive option for large and
medium insurers while small insurers may be more likely to adopt the standard formula.
3.4 Impact on Insurer’s Investment Strategies
The quantitative impact study results show that the Solvency II applies differential
capital charges to insurers based on their actual risks they run. This feature could lead to
significant changes in insurers’ investment and asset liability matching (ALM) strategies.
Since SCR is composed of multiple risks charges, an obvious strategy for
insurance companies will be to decompose the aggregate risk of portfolio and set limits
to each risk component in accordance to the risk charge. This strategy is convenient for
insurance firms and will gradually gain popularity because each of the risk charges will
be calculated before insurers report their SCR.
The market risk module and its sub-modules elaborated in the QIS 5 technical
specification provides clues about how insurers will change their investment strategies.
Ideally, mathematical verification will better predict the changes. However, this is
beyond this paper. This paragraph will do the predictions intuitively based on the
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Source: “According to Article 112(2) of the Level 1 Text, undertakings may use partial internal models for the
calculation of: one or more risk modules, or sub-modules of the Basic SCR; the capital requirement for operational risk
and the adjustment for the loss-absorbing capacity of technical provisions and deferred taxes. In addition, partial
modelling may be applied to the whole business of undertakings, or only to one or more major business units.”
Section 3.1, CEIOPS’ Advice for Level II Implementing Measures on Solvency II: Partial Internal Models.
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information in the market risk modules. The directive imposes charges on interest rate
risks. Since the expected return on these risks is usually lower than equity and credit23,
insurers are expected to reduce their exposure to interest rate. Spread risk is subject to
capital charges based on credit quality and duration. This will discourage companies
from taking on high level of credit risk or longer-dated credit risk because long-duration
corporate bonds will attract a significant capital charge for spread risk24. This will make
short duration and highly rated corporate bonds popular for insurers. In addition, the
Solvency II gives a zero spread weight to all AAA/AA- rated sovereign debt. Therefore,
insurers will reduce long-term corporate bond holdings and increase the sovereign
debt.25 Solvency II imposes significant capital charge on equity risk as 39% of base level
is assigned to global equity and 49% to other equity26. This will make insurers reduce
investment into equities.
Asset-liability matching has long been a challenging issue facing insurance firms.
Under Solvency II, ALM will become more complex and uncertain. Since the directive
will place a lower capital charge on derivatives and short-dated bonds, especially on
European Economic Area (EEA) sovereign debt, short-duration, highly rated credit will
be favored and use of derivatives to achieve duration matching will increase. A survey
conducted by Black Rock in 2011 finds that 64% of the survey respondents will allocate
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See http://www.bonddeskgroup.com/main/market-data/historical-returns/bond-vs-equity-returns; 20-year bond
and S&P 500 return, the latter significantly higher than the former
24
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See SCR.5.9 Market Spread Risk, QIS 5 Technical Specification

See SCR5.9 Market Spread Risk, QIS 5 Technical Specification
See SCR5.31 and SCR5.34, QIS 5 Technical Specification. Equity investment is divided into Global equity category
and Other equity category. The Global category refers to the equities listed in countries which are member of EEA or
OECD. The Other category refers to the equities listed in emerging market, non-listed equity, hedge fund, and any
other investments not included elsewhere in the market risk module.
26
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more assets towards fixed income, especially government bonds. A joint study
conducted by Oliver Wyman and Morgan Stanley in 2011 finds that short-duration, high
quality, investment grade credit assets and real estate lending are the most attractive
risk asset classes.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLICATION TO US INSURERS AND REGULATIONS

Although Solvency II is a European regulation, its influence extends far beyond
the EU because EU insurance companies have subsidiaries in other markets and insurers
from other markets have subsidiaries in the EU. Many countries are considering
adopting the directive or modifying existing regulations to be consistent with the
directive. Solvency II recognizes the regulatory regimes in other countries if they meet
the “equivalence” principles. The directive outlines 6 principles that need to be met in
order for the capital standards of a jurisdiction to be considered “equivalent” to
Solvency II. They include:
1. Powers and responsibilities of the supervisory authority;
2. Authorization requirements to undertake (re)insurance business;
3. System of governance and its regulatory oversight;
4. Business change assessment;
5. Solvency assessment; and
6. Supervisory cooperation, exchange of information, and professional secrecy.
If a country is certified by EU against the six principles as an “equivalence”
jurisdiction, then EU subsidiaries in the country will only need to meet local capital
requirements. The US regime does not meet all of these principles and the two systems
28

have many differences in their capital requirements, supervisory reporting, data
collection and analysis, and information disclosure.
4.1 Different Capital Requirements Between Solvency II and US Regulation
Solvency II and the US regulations have two different approaches in defining
capital requirements.27 Under the US regime, life, property & casualty (P&C), and health
have a separate RBC formula, each containing own set of risk factors that focus on the
most material risks at the industry level while SCR and MCR formula are the same across
different insurance types and SCR and MCR takes into account all quantifiable risks. In
the RBC formula, risk factors are multiplied to produce RBC charges to each item and
then the charges are summed into several baskets and subjected to a covariance
adjustment to reflect the assumed independence of risks. Currency risk and catastrophe
risk are not included in the RBC formula. Operational risk is covered in the Life RBC
formula but not in the P&C formula.
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The Tail VaR (T VaR) provides the conceptual foundation for the US risk-based capital system, while Solvency II
defines two levels of capital requirements, SCR and MCR, calibrated based on 99.5% and 85% confidence levels
respectively.
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Under Solvency II, the internal models must be approved by supervisory
authorities before they can be used and are subject to continuing monitoring. Under the
US RBC system, the application of internal models is limited to specific products and risk
modules and prescribed parameters and time horizons,28 while internal models under
Solvency II can be used for calculating SCR for all or some of the risks.
In the US, insurance regulatory reporting is based on Statutory Accounting
Principles (SAP). Although SAP is based on US GAAP, it is more conservative in asset
valuation in that SAP only considers assets that would be available to pay claims at the
reporting date. In the EU, assets are valued on fair market value. Expected profit in
future premiums are allowed to reduce technical provision under Solvency II but not
under RBC. Another difference is that goodwill is allowed to be recognized under SAP as
up to 10% of an insurance company’s adjusted capital and surplus but is not recognized
under Solvency II.
As discussed in previous paragraphs, technical provisions are based on a marketconsistent basis under Solvency II and consist of the best estimate and risk margin. The
best estimate represents the probability weighted average of all future cash flows
discounted using a risk free term structure. The risk margin represents the cost of
capital to support the product until liabilities are fully covered. As a comparison, there is
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See the second paragraph on page 48 in “Comparing Certain Aspects of the Insurance Supervisory and Regulatory
Regimes in the European Union and the United States”, September 27, 2012
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no equivalent concept of risk margin in the RBC regime and liabilities are discounted on
own corporate bond yields29.
4.2 Difference in Supervisory Reporting, Data Collection, Analysis, and Disclosure
Regarding reporting and information disclosure, the two regimes share many
commonalities. For example, both regimes require insurers to identify key risks and
both have comprehensive databases to facilitate analysis and monitor regulatory
compliance. The two regimes differ in that Solvency II requires groups, as well as
individual companies, to report to the regulatory authority, reporting in the US is done
only at the company level.
The EU currently does not have a centralized database to warehouse the
reporting data; instead, each nation maintains its own database. However, Solvency II
requires that a centralized data warehouse administered by EIOPA be created. In the US,
a centralized database has been under NAIC’s (National Association of Insurance
Commissioners) administration for over 15 years. The database captures all quantitative

disclosures and some qualitative disclosures. Under Solvency II, supervisory bodies and
EIOPA will use the data to perform risk assessment and financial stability analysis and
will issue a semi-annual financial stability report. In the US, the centralized database is
accessible to NAIC and all state insurance regulators. Many tools have been available for
use over 15 years. Each state can also develop its own tools to address unique needs in
the state.
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Refer to page 52 in “Comparing Certain Aspects of the Insurance Supervisory and Regulatory Regimes in the
European Union and the United States”, September 27, 2012
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Regarding the difference in disclosure, public disclosure concerns the Solvency
Financial Condition Report (SFCR) in the EU while it refers to the financial statement,
management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A), and actuarial opinion in the US. The
contents of SFCR, including the detailed information on capital requirements and
management, are publicly available while RBC filing contents are largely private except
for the risk-based capital30.
Solvency II requires insurers to disclose risk management via the Own Solvency
and Risk Assessment (ORSA) report, while the US regime does not have a comparable
requirement.
4.3 Implications to US Insurers
The difference between the RBC and Solvency II has implications and challenges
to US insurers.
On one hand, European insurers are required to report the consolidated capital
requirements covering their overseas operations including US subsidiaries. This requires
that the US subsidiaries provide MCR and SCR calculations and must meet Pillar II
requirements in regarding to risk management practices and structure. The overall
effect is that US subsidiaries will have material extra reporting work to perform for
European parents. Since Solvency II is based on market-consistent principles and gives
no current credit for anticipated future credit spread, the value of liabilities may
increase, which in turn would decrease reported capital. As a result, US subsidiaries
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See page 97 in “Comparing Certain Aspects of the Insurance Supervisory and Regulatory Regimes in the European
Union and the United States”, September 27, 2012
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might find themselves in a weaker financial position if they adopt Solvency II 31,32.
Therefore, the European parents may have to hold extra capital to cover the subsidiaries
in the US. In extreme cases where a large amount of additional capital is required, the
European parent may have an incentive to spin off the subsidiaries.
On the other hand, European subsidiaries of US insurers are required to submit
Solvency II filings in the same way as if they were an EU firm. If a US insurer owns
multiple subsidiaries in EU, each of them must report under Solvency II regime. This may
motivate the US parent to consolidate its EU operation into one EU entity.
4.4 Future Regulatory Changes in the US
Given the potential impact on insurance business in and outside EEA, many nonEU countries are seeking the equivalence either by adopting Solvency II or by revising its
own regulations. In the US, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
formed the Solvency Modernization Initiative (SMI) task force to work through a critical
self-examination to update the solvency regulations in the nation. In addition to the
review of international developments regarding insurance supervision, banking
supervision, international accounting standards, and their potential use in US, the SMI
will focus on capital requirements, international accounting, insurance valuation,
reinsurance, and group regulatory issues.
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US regulation allows anticipated credit spreads to be included in the rate to discount liabilities. Therefore gives
lower liabilities
32
Capital requirement for US firms could double under Solvency II, estimated by Morgan Stanley and Oliver Wyman
Research “Solvency 2: The Long and Winding Road”
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According to the latest update on the progress of SMI33, the US version of ORSA
has been developed and will be incorporated into the future regulation. Another
significant achievement is that the group supervision which is missing in current
regulation has been developed. This is an important step to reinforce insurers’
corporate risk management in the US.
Besides, the SMI continues to improve other issues in the RBC formula and
governance and risk management. The SMI is considering adding the missing risks in
current RBC formula such as catastrophic risk and currency risk. SAP and the method to
combine risk charges are under evaluation.
In the efforts to improve the corporate governance side of the regulations, the
SMI is revising the guidelines based on the review of financial examinations conducted
among the insurers, lessons learned in the recent financial crisis, studies of current case
law in various US states, and the governance principles & standards placed by the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and authorities in other
countries. This task is expected to be completed in December 2012.34
The task force is trying to transition the valuation principles from current SAP
based to principle-based. The Valuation Manual which is a new valuation guideline is
under development. According to the new provision, the principle-based valuation
requirements will become effective after at least 42 states adopt the Valuation Manual.
This task is projected to complete in 2013.
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Solvency Modernization Initiative Roadmap, August 2012
See item 3 in “Solvency Modernization Initiative Road Map”, March 29,2012
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4.5 Implications to Credit Rating
Solvency II is built around risk based capital requirements and the emphasis on
enterprise risk management (ERM). Therefore, with the application of the regulation,
insurers will gain better credit rating because capital is an important quantitative
element and ERM is an important qualitative element of credit rating.
Solvency II will result in an enhanced ERM system in insurers because the directive
imposes higher standards of corporate governance and risk management. The Pillar II
creates the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA), under which firms must evaluate
its own risks, capital requirements, and adequacy of capital resources. Consequently,
companies must develop a robust risk management strategy that will focus on both
regulatory and economic capital.
ERM has been part of S&P rating equation since 2008. The ERM assessment
includes risk management culture, risk control, risk model, emerging risk management,
and strategic risk management. The adequate implementation of Solvency II will require
an insurer to meet the rating agency’s ERM requirements. For example, ORSA will help
the firm to set up a forward-looking system to monitor the firm’s risk profile, control the
risk, and ensure the proper level of capital. The standard formula of SCR covers all
critical risks and could support business decisions. Internal models must include
sufficient risks, integrated with risk management system, and update regularly.
Solvency II imposes a relatively higher standard on capital requirements. The
standard formula of SCR is calibrated to a 99.5% value at risk over a one year period. As
35

a comparison, S&P BBB rating is calibrated to 97.2% over one year, A on 99.4%, AA on
99.7%, and AAA on 99.9%. The standard formula has at least the same or even higher
capital requirement for other important risks compared with S&P’s capital model. The
overall non-life and reserve capital requirements could be 10% to 15% higher under the
standard formula than under S&P’s capital model. For the longevity risk, S&P capital
model assumes about 15% permanent decrease in mortality while the Solvency II
standard formula assumes 20% decrease. Operational risk and currency risk are not
included in S&P model but covered in the Solvency II standard model. 35 The higher
standard in capital requirement under the Solvency II translates into more capital held
by the insurance firms, thus, the lower leverage.
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These data come from “Impact of Solvency II on The European Insurance Industry and S&P Rating Analysis”, S&P
June 8 2012
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CHAPTER 5
INCORPORATING A CORRELATION MATRIX INTO THE US RBC CALCULATION
This chapter examines how the capital requirement will change for life insurers in
the US if the US regime adopts a correlation matrix in the calculation of the capital
requirement that is similar to that used in Solvency II.
The current version of the formula to calculate the capital requirement for a life
insurance company under the US system is:

ܴܥ = ܥܤ + ܥସ + ට (ܥଵ + ܥଷ )ଶ + (ܥଵ௦ + ܥଷ)ଶ + ܥଶଶ + ܥଷଶ + ܥସଶ

36

（5）

ܥ is the capital requirement for asset risk due to affiliated insurance companies
ܥସ is the capital requirement for business risk

ܥଵ is the capital requirement for asset risk due to other assets that are not categorized
in ܥ and ܥଵ௦

ܥଷ is the capital requirement for interest rate risk
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See “Risk Based Capital General Review (7/15/2009)”; internet access:
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_e_capad_RBCoverview.pdf
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ܥଵ௦ is the capital requirement for asset risk due to unaffiliated common stock and
affiliated non-insurance stock

ܥଷ is the capital requirement for market risk

ܥଶ is the capital requirement for insurance risk

ܥଷ is the capital requirement for health credit risk

ܥସ is the capital requirement for health administrative expense risk

Each component of life RBC is calculated by multiplying financial statement items,

for example, assets, premiums, expense, reserve etc., by risk factor charges.37 RBC is the
aggregation of the capital requirements for the component risks with covariance
adjustment. The correlation among the risks is assumed either 0 or 1 in the current
formula. For example, risk components in the parentheses are assumed perfectly
correlated while those between parentheses are assumed not correlated. This is a major
difference in the way to aggregate capital requirement under the two systems.
Compared with the covariance adjustment in RBC formula, the correlation
relationship among the risks under Solvency II is not assumed to be either zero or one.
The correlation coefficients are actually selected “in such a way as to achieve the
best approximation of the 99.5% VaR for the aggregated capital requirement”.38
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For calculation details, see 2012 Life Risk-Based Capital Forecasting & Instructions
See Section 3.15, “CEIOPS’ Advice for Level 2 Implementing Measures on Solvency II: SCR Standard Formula Article
111 (d) Correlations”, January 29, 2011
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NAIC’s SMI task force is investigating whether to adopt a correlation matrix to
improve the current RBC square root formula.39The adoption of a correlation matrix is
believed to significantly change the capital requirement for US insurers. In the following
paragraphs, the impact will be evaluated quantitatively.
To evaluate how the adoption of correlation matrix will change US insurers’
capital requirement, the author creates a representative life insurance company. Then
the capital requirement will be calculated by using the current formula and using the
Solvency II approach.
The representative life insurance company’s RBC for each risk component is
selected using the “Life Industry RBC Results for 2011” issued by NAIC. This document
reports the aggregated RBC for each risk component from 2007 to 2011 as well as the
total number of life insurers in each year. The document reports both pre-tax and posttax RBC. The average RBC by risk component for each insurer in each year is calculated.
The RBC profile of the fictitious life insurance company is the five year average of the
calculated average RBC. The risk profile is shown in Table 1.
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See Item 82, “The U.S. National State-Based System of Insurance Financial Regulation and the Solvency
Modernization Initiative”, March 2012

39

Table 1: Risk Profile of the Representative Life Insurance Company
Risk Component
C0
C1cs
C1o
C2
C3a
C3b
C3c
C4a
C4b

RBC (Thousand $)
(Pre-Tax)
$34,602
$34,351
$64,469
$36,244
$21,362
$2
$2,769
$11,248
$772

RBC (Thousand $)
(Post-Tax)
$22,924
$22,330
$46,356
$26,343
$13,885
$2
$2,881
$7,311
$772

Source: Author calculation based data in “Life Industry RBC Results for 2011”, NAIC, 2012

With the representative company created, the next step is to decide the
correlation matrix. There are two ways to determine it. The first one is to match the risk
components in US system to the components under Solvency II and then use the
correlation matrix developed for Solvency II. The second way is to calculate the
correlation coefficients among the RBC risk components using the historical RBC data
reported in the “Life Industry RBC Results for 2011”. Unfortunately, matching the risk
components under the two systems proved too difficult, and so I use the second
method.
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Figure 11: Life Insurance RBC Components
Life Insurer RBC
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Figure 11 shows the RBC components and the individual risks that comprise
each RBC components. This figure is developed based on various references.40 Under
RBC system, the sum of the RBC for each individual risk equals the RBC of each
component which is aggregated to the total RBC by using the current RBC formula.
Table 2 compares the risk components in both systems.

The health

administrative expense risk under RBC and the expense risk of the life insurance module
in Solvency II are similar risks in both systems. The other common risks are the health
provider credit risk under RBC and the default risk under Solvency II.
It is obvious that some individual risks are available in one system but missed in
the other. For example, operational risk, deferred tax, spread risk, currency risk,
concentration risk, illiquidity risk, revision risk, lapse risk, and longevity risk are included
in Solvency II but are not covered in RBC. Asset risks, such as ܥ and ܥଵ௦ , premium risk,
and reserve risk are captured in RBC but not in Solvency II. In addition, separate account
items are not included in Solvency II.
In some cases, risks at first appear comparable in both systems, but one further
analysis indicates that they are measuring different risks. For example, interest risk is
measured separately in RBC. It considers the risk of loss in life insurance due to interest
rate change (ܥଷ), which is also part of interest rate risk under Solvency II. However,
interest rate risk under the US system also includes the risk of loss in variable annuities
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References include SMI RBC Report by American Academy of Actuaries, January 31, 2011, Risk-Based Capital
General Overview (July 15, 2009), and Life Industry RBC Results for 2011
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products with guaranteed benefits (ܥଷ), 41 but this is not considered in Solvency II.
Mortgage risk in RBC and property risk in Solvency II seem to both measure property

risks. However, the former is about the default of mortgage principle or interest
payment and the latter is about how the value of a company’s asset and liability value
change with the change of property price.
Table 2: Comparison of the Risk Components under RBC and Solvency II

Item
No.

Risk

42

43

US RBC

Solvency II

Asset RiskAffiliate

The risk of default of assets for affiliated
investments

None

2

Off Balance
Sheet Risk

The risk of default of certain off-balance
sheet items including non-controlled asset,
derivative instruments, guarantees for
affiliates, and contingent liabilities

None

3

Common Stock
(Non-Affiliated)

The risk of fluctuation in fair value of the
common stock

None

4

Stock (Noninsurance)

The risk of fluctuation in fair value of the
common stock

None

5

Fixed Income

The risk of default of principles or interest of
fixed income assets, including bonds,
collateral loans, mortgage loans, short-term
investments, cash, and other long-term
invested assets

None

6

Equity Risk (Not
Included in 3 and
4

The risk of fluctuation in fair value of
unafiliated common and preferred stock, real
estate, and some long-term assets reported
in schedule BA

None

7

Mortgage Risk

The risk of default of principles or interest of

Called Property Risk under
Solvency II. The sensitivity of the

1
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See the definition of C3c on the page 3 in “Recommended Approach for Setting Regulatory Risk-Based Capital
Requirements for Variable Annuities and Similar Products, June 2005
42
The description of the risks are developed based on “SMI RBC Report by American Academy of Actuaries, January
31, 2011”
43
If not specified, the description is based on the “2009 Solvency II Directive”
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mortgage loans

values of assets, liabilities and
financial instruments to changes
in the level or in the volatility of
market prices of real estate

8

Reinsurance Risk

The risk of default of reinsurance
counterparties

None

9

Derivative Risk

The risk of default of derivative
counterparties

None

10

Real Estate Risk

The risk of fluctuation in fair value of
company owned real estate

None

11

Other Asset Risk

The risk of default of assets that are not
categorized in 1

None

Premium Risk

The risk of improper pricing assumptions,
mortality, morbidity, random fluctuation,
and catastrophic events

None

Reserve Risk

The risk of statistical fluctuations in claim
levels

None

The risk of life insurance loss due to change
in interest rate level

The sensitivity of the values of
assets, liabilities and financial
instruments to changes in the
term structure of interest rates,
or in the volatility of interest
rates

Health Provider
Credit Risk

The risk that health benefits prepaid to
providers become the obligation of the
health insurer

Called Default Risk under
Solvency II. The risk of possible
losses due to unexpected default,
or deterioration in the credit
standing, of the counterparties
and debtors of insurance and
reinsurance undertakings over
the following 12 months

16

Market Risk

The risk of loss in variable annuities products
with guaranteed benefits due to change in
interest rate level

The market risk under Solvency II
is an aggregated risk of other
risks

17

Premium
(Guarantee Fund)

The risk of mis-assessment of gurantee fund

None

18

Separate Account
Liability

The risk of mis-assessment of separate
account liability

None

12

13

14

15

Interest Rate Risk

44

19

20

21

23

24

25

26

27

Health
Administrative
Expenses Risk

Adj

Operational Risk

Equity Risk

Spread Risk

Currency Risk

Concentration
Risk

Illiquidity Risk

The risk related to the administrative
expenses of certain types of health insurance
exceeding the portion of the premium
allocated to cover these expenses

Called Expense Risk under Life
Insurance Risk Module. It is the
risk of loss, or of adverse change
in the value of insurance
liabilities, resulting from changes
in the level, trend, or volatility of
the expenses incurred in
servicing insurance or
reinsurance contracts

None

The risk of unexpected losses
through a simultaneous decrease
in technical provisions or
deferred taxes or a combination
of the two

None

The risk of loss arising from
inadequate or failed internal
processes, or from personnel and
systems, or from external events.

see 3,4,6

The sensitivity of the values of
assets, liabilities and financial
instruments to changes in the
level or in the volatility of market
prices of equities

None

The sensitivity of the values of
assets, liabilities and financial
instruments to changes in the
level or in the volatility of credit
spreads over the risk-free
interest rate term structure

None

The sensitivity of the values of
assets, liabilities and financial
instruments to changes in the
level or in the volatility of
currency exchange rates

None

The risks to an insurance or
reinsurance undertaking
stemming either from lack of
diversification in the asset
portfolio or from large exposure
to default risk by a single issuer
of securities or a group of related
issuers
The risk of increase of the value
of technical provisions due to a
decrease in the illiquidity

None
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premium

28

29

30

31

32

33

44

Mortality Risk

Longevity Risk

Disability
Morbidity Risk

Laps Risk

Revision Risk

CAT Risk

44

Included in Premium Risk

The risk of loss, or of adverse
change in the value of insurance
liabilities, resulting from changes
in the level, trend, or volatility of
mortality rates, where an
increase in the mortality rate
leads to an increase in the value
of insurance liabilities

None

The risk of loss, or of adverse
change in the value of insurance
liabilities, resulting from changes
in the level, trend, or volatility of
mortality rates, where a decrease
in the mortality rate leads to an
increase in the value of insurance
liabilities

Included in Premium Risk

The risk of loss, or of adverse
change in the value of insurance
liabilities, resulting from changes
in the level, trend or volatility of
disability, sickness and morbidity
rates

None

The risk of loss, or of adverse
change in the value of insurance
liabilities, resulting from changes
in the level or volatility of the
rates of policy lapses,
terminations, renewals and
surrenders

None

The risk of loss, or of adverse
change in the value of insurance
liabilities, resulting from
fluctuations in the level, trend, or
volatility of the revision rates
applied to annuities, due to
changes in the legal environment
or in the state of health of the
person insured

Included in Premium Risk

See SCR.5.11 in the “QIS 5 Technical Specification”
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The risk of loss, or of adverse
change in the value of insurance
liabilities, resulting from the
significant uncertainty of pricing

and provisioning assumptions
related to extreme or irregular
events
The risk of decrease in
assessment value of intangible
assets due to internal risks and
market risks that are derived
from the decrease of prices in the
active market, and also market
risks derived from unexpected
lack of liquidity of the relevant
active market, that may result in
an additional impact on prices,
even
34

Intangible Risk

None

impeding any transaction.
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Another scenario is that some risks are partially shared. For example, both
systems consider equity risk. However, the equity risk under RBC is evaluated separately
based on whether they are held by affiliated organizations or un-affiliated ones. The
mortality risk and morbidity risk are covered by premium risk in RBC system but they are
categorized as an individual risk category under Solvency II.
In summary, the comparison of the risk components in the two systems in Table 2
proves that the risk components of the two systems are not matched. Therefore, the
correlation matrix of RBC cannot be derived from the ones in Solvency II. As a result, the
historical RBC data are used to obtain the correlation relationship among the risks. The
pre-tax and post-tax correlation matrix is demonstrated in Table 3 and Table 4
respectively.
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See SCR.4 in “QIS 5 Technical Specification”
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Table 3: Pre-tax Correlation Matrix of RBC Risk Components
C0
C1cs
C1o
C2
C3a
C3b
C3c
C4a
C4b

C0

C1cs C1o

C2

C3a

C4a

C4b

1
0.93
0.31
0.06
0.44
0.00
0.48
-0.15
0.07

1
0.54
0.34
0.61
0.00
0.61
0.00
0.20

1
0.87
0.00
0.67
0.88
0.85

1
0.00
1
0.61 0.00
1
0.74 0.00 0.55
1
0.72 0.00 0.80 0.93

1

1
0.96
0.97
0.00
0.67
0.80
0.78

C3b

C3c

Source: Author calculation based data from 2007 to 2011 reported in “Life Industry RBC
Results for 2011”, NAIC, 2012

Table 4: Post-tax Correlation Matrix of RBC Risk Components

C0
C1cs
C1o
C2
C3a
C3b
C3c
C4a
C4b

C0

C1cs C1o

1
0.92
0.27
-0.17
0.40
0.00
0.42
-0.19
0.05

1
0.54
0.15
0.61
0.00
0.17
0.00
0.20

C2

C3a

1
0.88
1
0.97 0.75
0.00 0.00
-0.03 -0.15
0.82 0.91
0.81 0.85

C3b

C3c

C4a

C4b

1
0.00
1
-0.01 0.00
1
0.74 0.00 0.12
1
0.72 0.00 0.38 0.93

1

Source: Author calculation based data from 2007 to 2011 reported in “Life Industry RBC
Results for 2011”, NAIC, 2012

The total RBC for the fictitious life insurer is then calculated by applying the
standard RBC formula and the Solvency II SCR aggregation formula which is as following:
ܴ = ܥܤඥ ∑, ݎݎܥ, × ܴܥܤ × ܴܥܤ

(6)

Where: ݎݎܥ, is the correlation matrix of the RBC risk components
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ܴܥܤ is the capital requirement for each component risk

The results are reported in Table 5.

Table 5: Capital Requirements
Standard Formula

Correlation Matrix
Adjusted

Pct. Change

Pre-Tax RBC

$146,145,063

$168,639,084

15%

Post-Tax RBC

$100,656,035

$111,709,224

11%

Source: Author calculation based data in “Life Industry RBC Results for 2011”, NAIC, 2012

The comparison of the capital requirement using both methods shows that the
adoption of Solvency II method would raise the pre-tax capital requirements by 15% and
post-tax capital requirements by 11%. Therefore, adoption of Solvency II method will
lead to higher capital requirements for life insurance companies in the US.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY
Solvency II is a new EU-wide solvency regime and substantively changes the
amount of capital that insurers will hold and the risk management practices that
insurers need to follow. The objectives of this paper are to briefly describe the Solvency
II directive, discuss its impact on European insurers’ capital holdings, examine its
implications for insurers’ investment strategies, and evaluate its influence on US
insurers.
Solvency II is built on three pillars which focus on capital requirements, risk
management, and public disclosure, respectively. Pillar I defines two levels of capital
requirements, the Solvency Capital Requirement (SCR) and the Minimum Capital
Requirement (MCR). SCR is defined as the level of capital that results in no more than a
0.5% chance of failure over a one-year time horizon. MCR is defined as the amount of
economic capital needed to limit the probability of insolvency over the coming year to
no more than 15%. Pillar II raises requirements on corporate governance and requires
demonstration of an adequate system of governance.
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A unique characteristic of Solvency II is that insurers are required to perform
Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA) which will make both the firm itself and the
supervisory bodies better understand a firm’s risk profile. Pillar III requires two types of
reports, The Regular Supervisory Report (RSR) and The Solvency and Financial Condition
Report (SFCR). The former is a confidential report between an insurer and its national
supervisory organization, providing narrative and quantitative information regarding
business performance, governance, risk profile, and capital management. The latter is a
report available to public and contains information regarding business performance,
governance, risk profile, capital management, and asset and liability valuation.
Compared with Solvency I, Solvency II significantly affects insurers’ assets and
liabilities and therefore capital. Under the Solvency II, in 2009, the asset valuation for
solo participants decreased by more than 0.3%, from €7,456.6 billion to €7,432.4 billion.
For group participants, the asset valuation decreased by 1.3%, from €6,543.1 billion to
€6,454.9 billion. Life insurance net provision increased by 3% and the ratio for non-life
insurance was 8%. EU insurers held 141% more capital under Solvency II than if under
Solvency I in 2009, increasing from €227 billion to €547 billion. As a result, capital
surplus under Solvency II decreased by €121.7 billion compared with that under
Solvency I, down from €476.3 billion to €354.6 billion. In addition, the average solvency
ratio also decreased from 310% under Solvency I to 165% under Solvency II.
Solvency II also reshapes insurers’ risk profiles. Under Solvency II, market risk is
the dominant risk across all insurers. Equity risk, spread risk, and interest rate risk are
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the three driving components of market risk. Besides the market risk, life insurance
firms bear significant large underwriting risks arising from life insurance contracts, of
which longevity and lapse risks are the two dominant components. In contrast, non-life
underwriting risk is the second largest risk next to market risk for non-life insurance
companies.
The US RBC system is different from Solvency II in all the three pillars. The
difference brings challenges to both US businesses and regulation. Solvency II requires
consolidated capital requirement. Therefore, an EU insurer’s US subsidiary must adopt
Solvency in addition to the US RBC requirement. This will add significant paperwork to
the US subsidiary. Likewise, a US insurer’s subsidiary in the EU must conform to Solvency
II requirement.
From the regulatory side, NAIC is reviewing the difference between the two
systems and working on closing the gaps. NAIC has made changes in capital
requirements, international accounting, insurance valuation, reinsurance, and group
regulatory issues. An important difference in the capital requirement under both
systems is that the RBC system assumes the correlation coefficients among the
component risks are either zero or one while Solvency II does not do so. NAIC is
considering adopting a similar correlation matrix. This paper performs a numerical
analysis to evaluate the impact on US insurers’ capital requirement by creating a
fictitious life insurance. The result shows that US insurers will hold 15% more pre-tax
capital or 11% more post-tax capital if a correlation matrix that is similar to those under
Solvency II is included in the computation.
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Solvency II has implications to insurers’ investment strategy since it imposes
different charges on different types of assets. AAA/AA- EU sovereignty bond will gain in
popularity because the risk charge on this type of bond is zero. In the same way, shortduration and highly-rated corporate bonds will be more favored by insurers than other
types of corporate bonds. Insurance companies are also expected to reduce their equity
investment because Solvency II imposes a high risk charge on equity.
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